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Abstract—Single Sign-on (SSO) allows users to only log on
once and then access different services via automatic authen-
tication by using the same credential. However, most existing
SSO schemes do not satisfy security notions or require a high
trust level on a trusted third party (TTP), even though SSO
has become popular in new distributed systems and computer
networks. Motivated by this fact, we formalise a new security
model of single sign-on, which not only satisfies strong security
notions but also has a low trust level on TTP. We then propose
a generic construction of SSO from nominative signatures, and
present concrete initialisation. We also provide formal proofs
to show that the proposed SSO scheme is secure according to
our new formal model, if the underlying nominative signature
is secure. We note that this is the first study that investigates
the link between SSO and nominative signatures, which also
be of an independent interest.
Keywords-Single sign-on, Authentication, Nominative signa-
ture, Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The growing number of current internet based services
leads more burden for users, because they may have to
maintain more and more username/password pairs. Mean-
while, this is also insecure and inefficient with the growth
in the number of services. Single sign-on (SSO) is an
authentication mechanism that allows users to only log on
one time and then access different services via automatic
authentication by using the same single credential. This
means that SSO may be an effective way to make users
relax at their daily work.
Kerberos is one of the earliest single sign-on solutions,
proposed by Steiner et al. [16] in 1988, though it is called
a network authentication system. The system consists of
an Authentication Server, a Ticket Granting Server and a
set of service providers. To acquire the Ticket Granting
Ticket from a Ticket Granting Server, a user should first
go through the authentication with Authentication Server.
Actually, Authentication Server and Ticket Granting Server
act together as a TTP (trusted third party), or called trusted
identity provider [5]), in an SSO scheme. However, not
only the process of authentication but also the infrastructure
management is very complex. Moreover, unproven symmet-
ric mechanisms are used in Kerberos to authenticate users,
which may lead to potential security weaknesses.
Released in 2005, OpenID [12] is one of the most
successful single sign-on solutions, which is an open and
decentralised approach for authenticating users. In OpenID,
the user can freely select the identity providers from any
web based application where he has registered with. Before
signing on to a given web based application that supports
OpenID, the user first signs on to the identity provider
and OpenID exchanges the necessary authentication data
between the identity provider and the application. However,
the mechanism of exchanging data is complex and can be
attacked through network based techniques [2].
In 2010, Han et al. [5] proposed a novel dynamic SSO
model together with a generic scheme. This scheme employs
a digital signature scheme to guarantee both the unforge-
ability and the public verification of credential. In addition,
a broadcast encryption is used to protect the privacy of
credential, which means that except the authorised service
providers nobody can check the validity of a credential.
After the credential verification the user should run zero-
knowledge proofs to prove that he/she is legal to use the
valid credential, for resisting against impersonation attacks.
However, the broadcast encryption is a complex and rather
inefficient. In 2012, Yu et al. [20] proposed a single sign-on
model with key exchange, and the advantage is that each
user does not need hold a public/private key pair, while this
is required in Han et al.’s model. However, the trust level of
TTP is higher than that in Han et al.’s model, because in Yu
et al.’s model the TTP is assumed to not impersonate any
user, which is rather unrealistic.
Unfortunately, most of existing SSO systems have short-
comings. For example, in some SSO systems-like [3], when
the user wants to access a service by using a credential,
the service provider (SP) has to directly communicate with
the TTP because SP cannot verify the validity of credential.
Another drawback is that some systems [9], [13], [14] are
fragile to resist single point of failure, as the TTP is required
to be always online. Moreover, SSO scheme proposed in
[16] does not prevent illegal usage of a personal credential,
since an illegal user can access services if he obtains a legal
user’s valid credential. Furthermore, SSO systems given in
[5], [20] require high trust level on the TTP. Based on
these shortcomings, we are motivated to study single sign-
on (SSO) in this paper by proposing a formal model and
giving a construction from nominative signatures.
Classical digital signatures have been widely used to
provide integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation for au-
thenticating electronic messages. However, sometimes the
users may not want their signatures being publicly verifiable.
Nominative signature is such a primitive supporting no
public verification. It consists of three parties: nominator,
nominee and verifier. The nominator and nominee jointly
generate a signature but only the nominee can verify it.
Moreover, the validity of a nominative signature can only
be determined by the help of the nominee, while any body
else (including the nominator) will not be able to show the
validity of the nominative signature to a verifier.
In 1996, Kim et al. [7] proposed the first notion and
construction of nominative signature. However, it was found
that the nominator can also verify the signature [6]. Then,
Huang and Wang [6] proposed a new convertible nominative
scheme, in which the nominee can convert a nominative
signature into a publicly verifiable one when necessary. Un-
fortunately, in [18], [4], [17], it was found that the nominator
in Huang-Wang scheme can generate valid signatures alone
and show the validity of the signature to anyone without the
consent of the nominee. In 2007, Liu et al. [10] proposed a
formal definition and a rigorous set of adversarial models for
nominative signature, which is based on Chaums undeniable
signature [1] and a strongly unforgeable signature scheme.
In 2011, Schuldt and Hanaoka [15] proposed a stronger
security model of nominative signature with a provably
secure scheme.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we aim to formalise the
notion of single sign-on (SSO). This notion is motivated by
the need of strong security requirements and low trust level
of TTP in a single sign-on system. Then, we construct a
generic SSO scheme from nominative signatures and prove
that this SSO is secure under the proposed security model, by
assuming that the underlying nominative signature is secure
according to the model introduced by Schuldt and Hanaoka
[15]. This means that we establish a relation between a cryp-
tographic primitive and a security application: nominative
signatures are a sufficient tool to construct SSO with low
trust level of TTP. In addition, a concrete intialisation of the
generic SSO is also presented.
Paper Organization. In Section 2, we propose the formal
definition and security notions for SSO. We review the for-
mal definition and security notions of nominative signature
in Section 3. Section 4 proposes a generic construction of
SSO transformed from nominative signatures. In Section 5, a
concrete initialisation is described. In Section 6, we provide
formal security analysis of the proposed SSO scheme. In
Section 7, we give some discussions and a short conclusion.
II. FORMAL MODEL OF SINGLE SIGN-ON
In this section, we provide a formal security model for
single sign-on (SSO) model, which specifies both the syntax
and security properties of SSO.
A. Syntax of Single Sign-on
In a SSO model, a user (U) obtains a single credential
from a trusted third party (TTP) once and then authenticates
himself to different service providers (SPs) by using the
same credential. Now we formalise the syntax of SSO as
follows by specifying its components:
Definition 1. A Single Sign-on scheme comprises a trusted
third party TTP, a group of service providers SPs and a
group of users U. It consists of four algorithms and two
protocols: system setup algorithm Setup, user key genera-
tion algorithm UKGen, enrollment algorithm Enrol, cre-
dential generation protocol CreGen, credential verification
algorithm CreV er, and confirmation/disavowal protocol
Con/Dis.
- Setup(k): On input 1k where k ∈ N is a security
parameter, it returns a list of public parameters par
and a public-private key pair (pk, sk) of TTP.
- UKGen(par): On input public parameters par, this
probabilistic algorithm returns a public-private key pair
(pki, ski)← g(1k) for a user.
- Enrol(par,RI): On input public parameters par, a
service provider SP ′js registration information RIj
which includes SP ′js username and some other in-
formation, or a user U ′is registration information RIi
which includes U ′is username, his public key pki and
some other information, TTP executes Enrol (par,RI)
and returns IDj to SPj , or IDi = (Ui, pki, AUi) to
Ui, where IDj and IDi are the identities of SPj and
Ui, AUi is U ′is access right which is a set consisting
of the identities of the service providers that the user
can access to.
- CreGen(pk, pki, IDi, par)[TTP (sk), Ui(ski)]: The
public input are TTP’s public key pk, a user Ui’s public
key pki, Ui’s identity IDi, and public parameters par.
TTP holds its private key sk, and Ui holds his private
key ski. This algorithm outputs a credential Crei for
user Ui.
- CreV er(Crei, ski, pk, par): On input a user Ui’s cre-
dential Crei, Ui’s private key ski, TTP’s public key pk
and public parameters par, it returns if Crei is valid
or invalid.
- Con/Dis(Crei, pki, pk, par)[Ui(ski), SPj ]: The pub-
lic input are a user Ui’s credential Crei and his public
key pki, TTP’s public key pk and public parameters
par, while Ui’s private input is his private key ski.
If valid ← CreV er(Crei, ski, pk, par), the confirma-
tion protocol is carried out; otherwise, the disavowal
protocol is carried out. If the confirmation protocol
runs successfully and SP ′js identity IDj ∈ AUi,
SPj accepts Ui’s authentication request; otherwise it
rejects.
Remark 1. Compared to the formal models given in [5],
[20], our model not only satisfies the strong security notions
of SSO, but also reduces the trust level of TTP, because
TTP can neither generate the credential without the user’s
involvement nor impersonate the user by running Con pro-
tocol. Moreover, different from [5] no broadcast encryption
is required here, so our model is simpler and more efficient.
B. Security Definitions of Single Sign-On
Security requirements are crucial for a security system.
In an SSO scheme, the TTP most concerns about whether
others can generate the credential without its involvement.
Users mainly worries about whether others who obtains his
credential can access to SPs by impersonating him. The ser-
vice providers most concern about whether their sevices can
be accessed without holding a valid credential. Therefore,
in the following we propose and formalize three security
notions which should be considered. Namely, unforgeability,
security against impersonation, and soundness. In order to
formalise each security notion for SSO, we will define a
series of games between two Turing machines: Challenger
C and Adversary A.
1) Unforgeability: Intuitively, unforgeability means that
any adversary A should not be able to forge a credential of
a user Ui if either the TTP’s private key sk or the U ′is private
key ski is unknown. Formally, we say that a SSO scheme
is unforgeable, if no polynomially bounded adversary A has
a non-negligible advantage against the challenger C in the
following two games:
Game 1. Unforgeability I
• Setup. C runs Setup(k) to generate the public parame-
ter par and the public-private key pair (pk, sk) of TTP.
It sends A the public parameter par and the public key
pk of TTP.
• Create user oracle. A can adaptively enroll user Ui. A
generates the public-private key pair (pki, ski) of Ui by
running UKGen algorithm and sends the registration
information RIi to C. C returns IDi = (Ui, pki, AUi)
to A.
• Credential generation oracle. A can adaptively run the
protocol CreGen by using IDi with C. If the protocol
runs successfully, A will receive a valid credential
Crei.
Finally, A outputs (ID∗, Cre∗), where ID∗ =
(U∗, pk∗, AU∗). A wins the game if
1) V alid← CreV er(Cre∗, sk∗, pk, par).
2) ID∗ has not been queried to Credential generation
oracle.
A’s advantage is defined to be the probability that A wins.
Remark 2. In this game, A can verify the credential by
himself after he corrupted the pki. Therefore, verification
oracle is not necessary.
Remark 3. In this game, Con/Dis execution oracles are
also not provided. The reason is that as the service provider
SP does not hold any private parameter and A can corrupt
all the users, A can run the protocols Con or Dis alone
by playing both roles of SPj and Ui.
Game 2. Unforgeability II
• Init. C sends a target ID∗ = (U∗, pk∗, AU∗) to A.
• Setup. C runs Setup(k) to generate the public param-
eter par and then sends par to A. A generates the
public-private key pair (pk, sk) of TTP.
• Create user oracle. A can adaptively enroll user Ui. A
generates the public-private key pair (pki, ski) of Ui by
running UKGen algorithm and sends the registration
information RIi to C. C returns IDi = (Ui, pki, AUi)
to A.
Finally, A outputs a credential Cre∗. A wins the game if
1) V alid← CreV er(Cre∗, sk∗, pk, par).
2) A has not obtain sk∗.
A’s advantage is defined to be the probability that A wins.
Definition 2. A Single Sign-on system is said to be unforge-
able if no PPT (Probabilistic Polynomial Time) adversary
has a non-negligible advantage in either Game 1 or Game
2.
2) Security against impersonation: Security against im-
personation means that even though the adversary A has
obtained the credential of a user Ui, A should not be able to
impersonate Ui to access to SPs by executing SSO protocols.
Formally, we say that a SSO scheme is secure against
impersonation, if no polynomially bounded adversary A has
a non-negligible advantage against the challenger C in the
following game:
Game 3. Security against impersonation
• Init. C sends a target U∗ with ID∗ and corresponding
credential Cre∗ to A.
• Setup. C runs Setup(k) to generate the public parame-
ter par and sends to A. A generates the public-private
key pair (pk, sk) of TTP.
• Create user oracle. A can adaptively enroll user Ui. A
generates the public-private key pair (pki, ski) of Ui by
running UKGen algorithm and sends the registration
information RIi to C. C returns IDi = (Ui, pki, AUi)
to A.
• Confirmation oracle. There are two cases:
1) A (as SPj) can adaptively run the protocol Con
with C (as U∗) using Cre∗. It returns accept or
reject.
2) A (as eavesdropper) can adaptively eavesdrop the
conversions when U∗ using Cre∗ runs protocol
Con or Dis with C (as SPj). This oracle returns
the accept or reject and the transcript of the
protocol.
Finally, A has to run confirmation protocol Con with a
SPj . A wins the game if
1) SPj returns accept.
2) A has not obtain sk∗.
A’s advantage is defined to be the probability that A wins
the game.
Definition 3. A Single Sign-on system is said to be secure
against impersonation if no PPT adversary has a non-
negligible advantage in Game 3.
3) Soundness: Soundness means that any adversary A
should not be able to access to SPs if the TTP does not
generate a corresponding credential and sends it to A.
Formally, we say that a SSO scheme is soundness, if
no polynomially bounded adversary A has a non-negligible
advantage against the challenger C in the following game:
Game 4. Soundness
• Setup. C runs Setup(k) to generate the public parame-
ter par and the public-private key pair (pk, sk) of TTP.
It sends A the public parameter par and the public key
pk of TTP.
• Create user oracle. A can adaptively enroll user Ui. A
generates the public-private key pair (pki, ski) of Ui by
running UKGen algorithm and sends the registration
information RIi to C. C returns IDi = (Ui, pki, AUi)
to A.
• Credential generation oracle. A can adaptively run the
protocol CreGen by using IDi with C. If the protocol
runs successfully, A outputs a Crei.
Finally, A has to select a target U∗ with ID∗ and then
runs protocol Con with SPj . A wins the game if
1) SPj returns accept.
2) ID∗ has not been queried to Credential generation
oracle.
A’s advantage is defined to be the probability that A wins.
Remark 4. In this game, A may have two ways to win
the game: Forging a credential or successfully running
protocol Con without a valid credential. The case 1 has
been discussed in Game 1 and Game 2. Therefore, this game
focuses on the case 2.
Definition 4. A Single Sign-on system is said to be sound if
no PPT adversary has a non-negligible advantage in Game
4.
III. NOMINATIVE SIGNATURES
A. Syntax of Nominative Signatures
In this section, we describe one nominative signature
scheme which was proposed in [15]. A nominative signature
scheme involves a signer S and a nominee N, and is specified
by the algorithms described below.
- Setup: The input is a security parameter 1k, it outputs
a set of public parameters par.
- KeyGenS , KeyGenN : The input is the public parame-
ters par, it outputs a public-private signer and nominee
key pair, (pkS , skS) and (pkN , skN ), respectively.
- Sign: The inputs are par, pkN , a message m, and skS ,
it outputs a signature generation message δ.
- Receive: The inputs are par, pkS , m, a signature
generation message δ, and skN , it outputs a nominative
signature σ on m.
- Convert: The inputs are par, pkS , m, σ, and skN , it
outputs a verification token tkσ .
- TkV erify: The inputs are par, pkS , pkN , m, σ, and
tkσ , it outputs either accept or reject.
- (Confirm, VC): this is a pair of interactive algorithms
with common input (par, pkS , pkN , m, σ). The al-
gorithm Confirm is furthermore given skN as private
input. At the end of the interaction, VC will either
output accept or reject.
- (Disavow, VD): like in the confirm protocol, this is a
pair of interactive algorithms with the common input
(par, pkS , pkN , m, σ), and Disavow is given skN as
private input. At the end of the interaction, VD will
either output accept or reject.
- V alid: The inputs are par, pkS , pkN , m, σ, skN ,
this algorithm computes the verification token tkσ ←
Convert(par, pkS , m, σ, skN ) and it outputs the result
of TkV erify(par, pkS , pkN , m, σ, tkσ).
B. Security Notions for Nominative Signatures
For a nominative signature scheme to be secure [15], the
scheme should be unforgeable, invisible, and secure against
malicious signers. Additionally, the confirm and disavow
protocols are required to be zero-knowledge proofs.
1) Unforgeability: Unforgeability requires that it can not
generate a valid signatures without the signer i.e. a malicious
nominee should not be able to produce a signature on a
message m, and then convince a verifier that the signature is
valid, either by running the confirm protocol or by presenting
a verification token, without having requested a signature on
m from the signer.
Formally, we define unforgeability against a chosen mes-
sage attack (uf-cma) of a nominative signature scheme NS
via the experiment Expuf−cmaNS,A shown in Figure 1. By x
← AO (y) it means that the algorithm A is executed on
input y while being allowed to make queries to the oracle
O, and that the output of A is assigned to x. For a pair
of interactive algorithms, A and V, it writes z ←2 { A
(x1) ↔ V (x2)} (y) to mean that A and V interact with
common input y and private inputs x1 and x2 to A and V,
respectively, and that the output of V, upon the completion
of the interaction, is assigned to the variable z. Lastly, it will





(pkS , skS)← KenGenS(par)
(pk∗N ,m
∗, σ∗, tk∗δ , st)← AO(par, pkS)
z ←2 { A (st) ↔ VC(par, pkS , pk∗N ,m∗, σ∗)}
z′ ← TkV erify(par, pkS , pk∗N ,m∗, σ∗, tk∗δ )
if (pk∗N ,m
∗) /∈ LS∧ (z = accept ∨ z′ = accept)
output 1
else output 0
Figure 1. Unforgeability security experiment
Expmal−sigNS,A (1
k)
LR ← {}; LC ← {}
par ← Setup (1k)
(pkN , skN )← KenGenN (par)
(pk∗S ,m
∗, σ∗, tk∗δ , st)← AO(par, pkN )
z ← V alid(par, pk∗S , pkN ,m∗, σ∗, skN )
z′ ← TkV erify(par, pk∗S , pkN ,m∗, σ∗, tk∗δ )
if z = accept
z′′ ←2 {A(st)↔ VC(par, pk∗S , pkN ,m∗, σ∗)}
else
z′′ ←2 {A(st)↔ VD(par, pk∗S , pkN ,m∗, σ∗)}
if (z = accept ∧(pk∗S ,m∗, σ∗) /∈ LR) ∨




Figure 2. Malicious signer security experiment
polynomial time algorithm. In the experiment, A has access
to the oracle O = {OSign} defined as follows:
- OSign: The inputs are pkN and m, this oracle computes
δ ← Sign(par, pkN , m, skS), adds (pkN , m) to LS ,
and returns the signature generation message δ to A.
Definition 5. A nominative signature scheme NS is said to




k) = 1] which is negligible
in k .
2) Security against Malicious Signers: Our definition of
security against malicious signers requires that any adversary
with the knowledge of the private signer key should not
be able to (1) produce a new valid nominative signature
associated to the nominee, (2) convince a verifier about the
validity or invalidity of a signature through the confirm or
disavow protocols, regardless of the signature being valid
or not, or (3) produce an accepting verification token for a
signature he has not previously seen a verification token for.
Formally, Security against malicious signers of a nomi-
native signature scheme NS is defined via the experiment






N )← KenGenN (par)
(pk∗S ,m
∗, δ∗, st)← AO(par, pk∗N )
b← {0, 1}
if b = 0
σ∗ ← Receive(par, pk∗S ,m∗, δ∗, skN )
else (b = 1)
(pkN , skN )← KenGenN (par)
(pkS , skS)← KenGenS(par)
m←M(par)
δ ← Sign(par, pkN ,m, skS)
σ∗ ← Receive(par, pkS ,m, δ, skN )
b′ ← AO(st, σ∗)
if b = b′ output 1
else output 0
Figure 3. Invisibility security experiment
access to the oracles O = {OReceive, OConvert, OCon,
ODis} defined as follows:
- OReceive: The inputs are pkS , m and δ, this oracle
computes σ ← Receive(par, pkS , m, δ, skN ), adds
the tuple (pkS , m, σ) to the list LR, and returns σ to
A.
- OConvert: The inputs are pkS , m and σ, this oracle
adds the tuple (pkS , m, σ) to LC and returns the
verification token tkσ ← Convert(par, pkS , m, σ,
skN ).
- OCon: The inputs are pkS , m and σ, this oracle
interacts with A by running Confirm with the common
input (par, pkS , pkN , m, σ) and the private input skN .
- ODis: The inputs are pkS , m and σ, this oracle interacts
with A by running Disavow with the common input
(par, pkS , pkN , m, σ) and private input skN .
Definition 6. A nominative signature scheme NS is said to




k) = 1] which is negligible
in k .
3) Invisibility: To ensure that no information leaked from
the signer will reveal the validity of a signature, invisibility
requires that an adversary with the knowledge of the private
signer key, cannot distinguish between a valid signature, and
a random element of the signature space.
Formally, we define invisibility under a chosen message
attack (inv-cma) of a nominative signature scheme NS
via the experiment Expinv−cmaNS,A shown in Figure 3 where
M (par) is the message space defined by par. In the
experiment, A has access to the oracles O = {OReceive,
OConvert, OCon, ODis} defined as above.
Definition 7. A nominative signature scheme NS is said to




k) = 1]- 1/2 which is
negligible in k .
4) Protocol Security: Lastly, we require the confirm
and disavow protocols to be zero-knowledge proofs. More
specifically, consider the languages L(par) and L̄(par)
parameterized by par and defined by
L(par) = {(pkS , pkN ,m, σ) : ∃skNs.t.(pkN , skN ) ∈
{KeyGenN (par)}∧ V alid(par, pkS ,m, σ, skN )
= accept}
L̄(par) = {(pkS , pkN ,m, σ) : ∃skNs.t.(pkN , skN ) ∈
{KeyGenN (par)}∧V alid(par, pkS ,m, σ, skN )
= reject}
The confirm protocols is required to be a zero-knowledge
proof of membership for L, whereas the disavow protocol
is required to be a zero-knowledge proof of membership for
L̄.
IV. GENERIC CONSTRUCTION
This section describes how a nominative signature scheme
can be directly transformed into an SSO scheme, where a
nominative signature is employed as a user’s credential.
1) Setup. Runs the Setup(k) to generate the public
parameters par, which includes all public parameters
in this scheme, and runs KeyGenS(par) to generate
the public-private key pair (pk, sk) of TTP.
2) Enrollment.
• Service providers enrollment. SPj submits regis-
tration information RIj which includes the SP ′js
username and some other information to TTP.
TTP issues an identity IDj to SPj , and stores
(SPj , IDj) for SPj .
• User enrollment. Ui generates his public-private
key pair (pki, ski) by running KeyGenN (par).
Ui sends his registration information RIi which
includes the U ′is username, public key pki and
some other information to the TTP. The TTP
issues an identity IDi = (Ui, pki, AUi) to Ui,
where AUi is a set that consists of the identities
of the service providers that the user can access,
and stores (Ui, IDi) for Ui.
3) Single Sign-on.
• Login. Ui uses his username and corresponding
password to log in the system.
• Credential generation. Ui submits his IDi and
TTP checks it. If IDi has been registered, TTP
executes Sign(par, pki, IDi, sk) and sends a sig-
nature generation message δi to Ui. Ui exe-
cutes Receive(par, pk, IDi, δi, ski) and outputs
a nominative signature σi. The credential of Ui is
Crei = (IDi, σi).
• Service request. Ui sends a service request to the
service provider SPj(IDj ∈ AUi).
• Verification request. SPj asks Ui to show his
credential to him.
• Credential verification. Ui verifies the Crei by
executing V alid(par, pk, pki, IDi, σi, ski). If
it returns accept, then do the next step.
• Confirmation. Ui sends Crei to SPj , the protocol
Confirm(par, pki, pk, IDi, σi)[U(ski), SPj ] is
carried out. If the confirmation protocol runs suc-
cessfully, SPj executes the next step. Otherwise
SPj aborts.
• Service grant. If SPj’s identity IDj ∈ AUi, SPj
grants the services to the user. Otherwise, SPj
rejects the services.
If the user wants to access to other SPs whose identities
are listed in AUi, he can send credential to them directly,
without having to request the TTP to issue a new credential
for him, namely step (a) and (b) can be omitted.
V. INSTANTIATION
Now, we present a concrete SSO scheme by instantiating
the above generic SSO with the concrete nominative sig-
nature scheme proposed by Schuldt and Hanaoka in [15],
while their scheme is inspired by [19], [11].
1) Setup(k): given 1k, choose a bilinear map e: G1 ×
G1 → GT where |G1| = p, and a generator 〈g〉 =
G1. Lastly pick a collision resistant hash function
H: {0, 1}∗ → Zp and return par ← (e, p, g,H).
Given par, pick αS , v0, ..., vn ← Zp and hS ← G1,
and compute gS ← gαS and ui ← gvi for 1 ≤ i
≤ n. Furthermore, for m ∈ {0, 1}n, define FS(m)
= u0Πni=1u
mi
i where mi is the i-th bit of m, and
finally set TTP’s public-private key pair (pk, sk) as
pk ← (gS , hS , u0, ..., un) and sk ← αS .
2) Enrol(par,RI):
• Service providers enrollment: given par, SP ′js
registration information RIj which includes SP ′js
username and some other information. TTP issues
an identity IDj to SPj , and stores (SPj , IDj) for
SPj .
• Users enrollment: given par, pick αN , y1, y2,
v0,..., vn ← Zp and hN , k ← G1, and com-
pute gN ← gαN . Furthermore, for m ∈ {0, 1}n,
define FN (m) = u0, Πni=1u
mi
i where mi is
the i-th bit of m. Lastly compute x1 ←
gy
−1
1 and x2 ← gy
−1
2 , and finally U ′is gen-
erates his public-private key pair (pki, ski) as
pki ← (gN , hN , k, u0, ..., un, x1, x2) and ski ←
(αS , v0, ..., vn, y1, y2). Given par, Ui registration
information RIi which includes U ′is username,
public key pki and some other information. TTP
issues an identity IDi = (Ui, pki, AUi) to Ui,
where AUi is a set that consists of the identities
of the service providers that the user can access,
and stores (Ui, IDi) for Ui.
3) CreGen(pk, pki, IDi, par)[TTP (sk), Ui(ski)]:
Round 1: given par, pki, IDi, and sk, pick r ← Zp,
and compute δ1 ← gr and δ2 ← hαSS FS(pki||IDi)r.
Lastly TTP returns δ ← (δ1, δ2) to Ui. Round 2:
given par, pk, IDi, δ and ski, firstly check that
e(gS , hS)e(δ1, FS(pki||IDi)) = e(g, δ2) holds. If
this is not the case, return ⊥. Otherwise, pick r,
r′, s ← Zp and re-randomize δ by computing
δ′1 ← δ1gr
′





1 and σ2 ← (gr)y
−1
2 , and compute
t ← H(σ1||σ2||pk||IDi) and M ← gtks. Finally







i=1viMi , where Mi is
the i-th bit of M, and Ui outputs the signature
σi ← (σ1, σ2, σ3, s) and the credential Crei =
(IDi, σi).
4) CreV er(Crei, ski, pk, par): given par, pk, Crei
= (IDi, σi) and ski, first check that the equa-





FS(pki||IDi)FN (M)) hold, where M = gtks, and t =
H(σ1||σ2||pk||IDi), and if this is not the case, output
⊥. Otherwise, return the verification token tkσ ←
(σy11 , σ
y2
2 ). Given par, pk, pki, Crei = (IDi, σi) and
tkσ = (tk1, tk2), output valid if the equations e(σ1, g)
= e(tk1, x1), e(σ2, g) = e(tk2, x2), and e(g, σ3) =




2 , FS(pki||IDi)FN (M))
hold, where M = gtks, and t = H(σ1||σ2||pk||IDi).
Otherwise, output invalid.
5) Con (Crei, pki, pk, par)[Ui(ski), SPj ]: given
(par, pk, pki, Crei) as common input and
ski as the private input to Ui, let e1 =
e(g, σ3), e2 = e(gS , hS)e(gN , hN ), e3 =
e(σ1, FS(pki||IDi)FN (M)) and finally let e4 =
e(σ2, FS(pki||IDi)FN (M)) where M = gtks, and t
= H (σ1||σ2||pk||IDi). Then Ui and SPj interacts in
the protocol
ZKPK{(y1, y2) : xy11 = g∧x
y2





If the protocol runs successfully, SPj returns accept.
Otherwise, SPj returns reject.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Theorem 1. The SSO scheme proposed above is unforgeable
if the nominative signature scheme used above is unforge-
able and secure against malicious signers.
Proof: Suppose there exists an adversary A which can
break the unforgeability of our generic construction for SSO.
We will show that there exists an adversary B which can
break the unforgeability or the security against malicious
signers of above nominative signature scheme. There are
two cases for unforgeability.
Unforgeability I
• Init. B receives the public parameter par and a public
key pkS , and B runs A. B simulates an SSO scheme
by setting pkS as the public key of TTP and par as the
public parameter. Then B sends (par, pk) to A.
• Create user oracle. A can adaptively enroll user Ui. A
generates the public-private key pair (pki, ski) of Ui by
running UKGen algorithm and sends the registration
information RIi to B. B returns IDi = (Ui, pki, AUi)
to A.
• Credential generation oracle. A can adaptively run the
protocol CreGen by using IDi with B. B redirects
these queries to NS model’s oracle OSign. If the pro-
tocol runs successfully, A outputs a Crei = (IDi, σi).
Finally, A outputs (ID∗, Cre∗), where ID∗ =
(U∗, pk∗, AU∗) and Cre∗ = (ID∗, σ∗). According to the
Game 1, ID∗ has not been queried to Credential generation
oracle.
If V alid ← CreV er(Cre∗, pkS , sk∗, par), namely A
outputs a valid σ∗. So (pk∗, ID∗) /∈ LS ∧ accept ←
TkVerify (par, pkS , pk∗, ID∗, σ∗, tk∗δ ). This means B
can use A to break the unforgeability of the underlying
nominative signature according to Definition 5.
Unforgeability II
• Init. B receives the public parameter par and a public
key pkN , and B runs A. B sends a target ID∗ =
(U∗, pkN , AU
∗) to A.
• Setup. B sends the public parameter par to A. A
executes NS model’s algorithm KeyGenS to generate
TTP’s public-private key pair (pkS , skS).
• Create user oracle. A can adaptively enroll user Ui. A
generates the public-private key pair (pki, ski) of Ui by
running UKGen algorithm and sends the registration
information RIi to B. B returns IDi = (Ui, pki, AUi)
to A.
Finally, A outputs a credential Cre∗ = (ID∗, σ∗) of U∗.
According to the Game 2, A has not obtain skN .
If V alid ← CreV er(Cre∗, pkS , skN , par), namely A
outputs a valid σ∗. So accept← Valid(par, pkS , pkN , ID∗,
σ∗, skN ) ∧ (pkS , ID∗, σ∗) /∈ LR. This means B can use
A to break the security against malicious signers of the
underlying nominative signature specified in Definition 6.
Therefore, by combining Unforgeability I and Unforge-
ability II, we can conclude that the SSO scheme proposed
above is unforgeable if the underlying nominative signature
scheme is unforgeable and secure against malicious signers.
Theorem 2. The SSO scheme proposed above is secure
against impersonation if the nominative signature scheme
used above is secure against malicious signers.
Theorem 3. The SSO scheme proposed above is sound if the
nominative signature scheme used above is protocol secure.
The details of proofs for Theorems 1 and 2 are omitted
due to space limit.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this section, we give a comparison between our scheme
and Han et al.’s [5] scheme. In terms of security, both
schemes can resist forging attack and impersonation attack.
Moreover, both schemes can satisfy the requirement of
soundness because of a zero-knowledge proof. However, the
dependence for TTP of our scheme is lower, because TTP
can not generate a credential only by himself. In terms of
efficiency, Han’s scheme uses a broadcast encryption, which
reduces the efficiency of whole scheme. In our scheme, it is
guaranteed that even though the attacker obtains the content
of a credential, the attacker can not break the security of
our scheme. Therefore, our new SSO scheme meets stronger
security and is more efficient.
Security notions our scheme Han et al.’s scheme [5]
unforgeability yes, and stronger yes
impersonation yes yes
soundness yes yes, but not mention
trust level of TTP low high
Table I
THE COMPARISON ABOUT SECURITY NOTIONS
In conclusion, based on the observation that the current
SSO systems suffer from various security issues, we for-
malised a security model of single sign-on scheme and
implemented a generic SSO by using any secure nominative
signature scheme in this paper. In our model, SP is not
required to communicate with TTP when it verifies the
credential; an illegal person can not access to the SPs even
though he/she obtains a user’s valid credential; the soundness
is satisfied and furthermore, the dependence of trusted third
party is reduced.
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